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Chair Person: Len Broberg

Agency decision-makers ought to be required to use high quality science when making
decisions, particularly when those decisions determine how and the extent to which biodiversity
will be managed and protected on our public lands. In other words, the standards by which
agency decision-makers are measured ought to be raised. We can achieve this goal by requiring
them: (1) to screen scientific evidence for reliability and relevance, and (2) to base their decisions
on only and all that scientific evidence which is both reliable and relevant.
The reliability and relevance standard was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Court in that case
stated that the trial courts must act as “gatekeepers.” Commensurate with this statement, the
Court now requires trial court judges to screen scientific evidence for reliability and relevance.
Thus, if scientific evidence does not withstand the trial courts’ scrutiny, it must be excluded and,
hence, not considered by the jury.
Under the reliability prong, the Court articulated four criteria that courts are to consider when
determining whether or not to admit scientific evidence, and they are: (1) testability/falsifiability;
(2) peer review and publication; (3) rate o f error; and (4) general acceptance. Under the
relevance prong, the Court stated that trial courts must find a “fit” between the issue in question,
the facts o f the case, and the proffered evidence. It also noted that a scientific theory that is
uncertain should not be found irrelevant as most, if not all, scientific theories are to some degree
uncertain.
Though the Daubert criteria were developed for trial courts to use, I suggest that courts also
require that agency-decision makers act as “gatekeepers.” By doing so, the courts can provide a
“check” on the agency decision-making process, ensuring that agency decisions are based on
“high quality” science. The Daubert review will also ensure that the agency decision-makers
meaningfully consider science that contradicts their view, as I suggest courts require that agencies
consider all and only that scientific evidence which is both reliable and relevant. This second
step will make sure that sciences such as Conservation Biology receive a “fair hearing” in the
agency’s process.
The first hurdle to applying a Daubert review to the agency decision-making process is the
United States Supreme Court case, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984). In that case, the Court articulated the principle of agency deference. Specifically, the
Court developed a two-prong test courts must apply when deciding whether an agency decision is
consistent with the law. In the first prong, courts are to consider whether Congress directly
addressed the issue in question. If it had, then courts must ensure that the agency complied with
its mandate. If, however. Congress was silent on the issue in question, then courts, pursuant to
the second step, are to defer to the agency decision, so long as it was reasonable.
Though it appears Chevron’s principle o f deference conflicts with my suggested Daubert
review, it does not. Rather, courts are not technically conducting statutory interpretation by
requiring agency-decision makers to rely on “high quality” science. Even if one argues that
courts would be conducting statutory interpretation, the courts are empowered under the
“reasonable” requirement to apply a Daubert review to determine whether an agency decision
comports with the law. In other words, its hard to imagine that when Congress delegated

It
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authority to make a complex scientific decision to the agency, that it also delegated authority to
the agency to use unreliable or irrelevant scientific evidence when making that decision.
Consistent with this notion, courts in such a case ought to find an agency decision to be
unreasonable and require it to: (1) reconsider all and only that scientific evidence which is both
reliable and relevant; and (2) to choose a methodology that is supported by such evidence.
In this paper, I apply a Daubert review to three court cases in the context o f environmental
litigation and demonstrate how it can be conducted and why it is necessary. The strongest
argument for raising the standards by which agencies make decisions is that oftentimes those
decisions determine the fate o f biological communities. Furthermore, many species are
depending on us for their survival and the law requires agencies to protect such species and their
habitat. The principle of agency deference, therefore, ought to be modified and a Daubert review
conducted.

Ill
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Imagine a vast, roadless area o f old growth where forest com munities thrive,

roam freely, and exchange precious genetic material. Then, imagine that same area
crisscrossed with roads leading to campgrounds, clear-cuts, and mines. Small, isolated
patches o f old growth now float in a sea o f altered land. Yet, also imagine that the United
States Forest Service was charged with managing the old-grow th forest, and that it
permitted this fragmentation to occur because it had calculated how m uch habitat the oldgrowth dependent species needed to survive, that is, m aintain m inim um viable
populations, and then preserved those amounts—but only those amounts. Indeed, the
Forest Service's decision to provide for diversity through m aintenance o f small reserves
could, at one time, have found support in science.'
M ost biologists, however, now support the proposition that large reserves are
preferable to small ones, as such a decision takes other environmental factors into
consideration.^ For example, the microclimate on the edge o f a forest patch is different
than that o f the interior. Frequently it is “drier, brighter and m ore w i n d y . T h e
vegetation responds to this change in climate and, oftentimes, the structure and
composition o f the vegetation near the edge is markedly different than that o f the interior
and may not consist o f habitat suitable for those species the patch was set aside to
protect."* Predators and invasive weeds also gain access through edges, further threatening

' See Daniel Simberloff and Lawrence G. Abele, Island Biogeography Theory and Conservation
Practice, 191 SCIENCE 285-86(1976). See generally DAVID QUAMMEN, THE SONG OF THE
DODO 457-545 (1997) (discussing the history and substance of the arguments for and against large
reserves, also known as the single large or several small debate [SLOSS]).
‘ See Michael E. Soule & Daniel Simberloff, What Do Genetics and Ecology Tell Us About the Design
of Nature Reserves?, 35 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 19, 32 (1986) (stating that nature reserves
should be as large as possible) See also REED F. NOSS & ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER, SAVING
NATION’S LEGACY. 140-42 (1994).
’ See NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 198:.
" See BURGESS AND SHAPRE, FOREST ISLAND DYNAMICS IN MAN-DOMINATED
LANDSCAPES 67-95 (Springer-Verlag 1981).
I
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the viability o f forest communities inside.^ In fact, small, isolated forest patches cannot
always maintain their functional integrity.^
Other problems occur, too. All else being equal, small patches usually contain
smaller populations o f the species they were intended to protect than do larger ones. ’
Small populations are more vulnerable to extinction than large ones are, as several factors
predispose small populations to extinction.^ In addition to patch size problems, biologists
have begun to widely recognize the “fundamental need for populations o f m any species
to be connected in order to be viable.”^ For instance, if a single reserve is not able to
support a long-term viable population o f a species with large area requirements, then
connecting existing reserves with corridors o f suitable habitat may enable viable
populations to form.'® A fter taking all o f these additional environmental factors into
consideration, conservation biologists offered this solution to counteract the effects o f
habitat fragmentation: Create and connect lots o f large reserves, as they w ill enable large
populations to form and will provide a buffer against edge effects.
In many instances, however, the Forest Service fails to consider these additional
environmental factors. The courts, nevertheless, will usually defer to the agency without

^See NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 54, 203-04; Natural Areas Association,
Compendium on Exotic Species. NATURAL AREAS JOURNAL (1993) (including 43 articles on the
topic o f the invasion o f exotics); Katrin Bohnlng-Gaese, Mark L. Taper, and James H. Brown, Are
Declines in North American Insectivorous Songbirds Due to Causes on the Breeding Range?, 7
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 76-78 (1993).
* See Soule and Simberloff, supra note 2, at 25.
^See Reed F. Noss, Some Principles o f Consen’ation Biology As They Apply to Environmental Law, 69
Chi-Kent L. Rev. 893, 900 (1994); see also Bruce A. Wilcox and Dennis D. Murphy, Conservation
Strategy: The Effects o f Fragmentation on Extinction, 125 AMERICAN NATURALIST 879-887
(1985).
* Mark L Schaffer, Minimum Population Sizes fo r Species Conservation, 31 BIOSCIENCE 31, 131 -34
(1981); MICHAEL. E. SOULE, VIABLE POPULATION FOR CONSERVATION (1987). The most
important factors that predispose small populations to extinction are: environmental variation and
natural catastrophes, demographic stochasticity, genetic deterioration, metapopulation and dynamics.
NOSS AND COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 60.
"NOSS AND COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 151.
Reed F. Noss and Larry D. Harris, Nodes, Networks, and MUM's: Preserving diversity at all
scales. 10 ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 299-309 ( 1986).
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ever determining whether or not the method selected to provide for diversity (i.e.,
choosing to maintain small reserves instead o f large ones) was based on consideration o f
all that scientific evidence which was both reliable and relevant. A court may even permit
an agency to discard reliable and relevant evidence on the ground that uncertainty
surrounds its application.”
The courts, however, must accept what scientists have for years-scientific uncertainty
is a fundamental condition o f science.'^ Until then, critically important scientific
information will not be guaranteed a “fair hearing” ” in the agency decision-making
process. The challenge, then, for those individuals and groups com m itted to ensuring land
management agencies are making informed scientific decisions, is to direct the courts
focus away from scientific uncertainty and towards reliability and relevance.
In this article, I rely prim arily upon the science o f conservation biology and its
principles to demonstrate the importance and necessity for this shift in focus. I also
explore various ways in which the legal system can accommodate conservation biology
principles to ensure they are given a “fair hearing.” The issues discussed in this paper,
however, apply not only to conservation biology, but also to those other scientific
principles that exist now and that will inevitably emerge in the future. I f such principles
are reliable and relevant, they too should receive a “fair hearing.”
This article is divided into five parts, not including the introduction. In Part II, I
discuss conservation biology's principles o f reserve design and m anagement for target
species. In Part III, I discuss the Supreme Court's decision in D m b ert v. M errell D ow
Pharmaceuticals, IncJ'' and the factors courts are to consider when adm itting scientific

" See generally Sierra Club v. Marita ("Marita II"), 46 F.3rd 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
DOUGLAS J. FUTUYAMA, SCIENCE ON TRIAL 163, 164 (1983).
”A
hearing” is when an agency considers scientific evidence and meaningfully discusses its
implications before making its decision.
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evidence. I also suggest a two-part Daubert review courts should conduct when
reviewing an agency’s administrative record to determ ine w hether the agency s decision
comports with the law. In Part IV, I discuss the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc.

V.

Natural Resources Defense Council, /n c ," and argue that when questions o f

scientific methodology arise, courts should apply the suggested two-step Daubert review
to determine whether use o f a particular methodology is a reasonable interpretation o f a
statutory provision. In Part V, I argue that, in light o f the National Forest M anagement
Act's (NFMA) diversity requirement, courts should not defer to an agency's scientific
assumptions until the court has satisfied itself, through use o f the two-part review, that
they are reasonable. Finally, in Part VI, I argue that, pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act's (NEPA) “hard look” requirement, the courts should also
conduct the two-part review to ensure agency com pliance with this law.
The two-step Daubert review may be applicable in other areas o f environmental law
as well. But these three areas o f law—Chevron, NFM A, and NEPA—should enable one to
discern whether a Daubert review is necessary and w hether a certain area provides a
more compelling reason than another does for extending the review. It should also be
noted that I have lim ited the scope o f my legal discussions, for the most part, to Supreme
Court decisions and the Ninth Circuit Court o f Appeal's interpretation o f them.

II.

CONSERVATION BIOLOGY PRINCIPLES
Before we walk through the forest o f laws, I will briefly review the history o f

conservation biology as well as some o f its essential principles. To do so will give
context and meaning to the discussions in Parts III through VI.
Conservation biology emerged in the I970's, and the unquestioned goal o f its

509 U.S. 579(1993).
"467 U.S. 837(1984).
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members is to maintain biodiversity.'^ Its m ission-oriented character'’ and the enlistment
o f not only biologists, but also “geographers, sociologists, economists, philosophers,
lawyers, political scientists, educators, artists, and other professionals,” is what sets it
apart from other sciences.'* Conservation biology's m ost striking feature, however, is that
its theories combine a body o f statements about ecology and population genetics that help
explain the biodiversity o f ecosystems.'^
W ide acceptance o f conservation biology’s theories by the mid-1980's led to the
formation o f the Society for Conservation Biology. Despite gaining acceptance into the
scientific community, conservation biology's ecological principles have been continually
tossed aside by agency decision makers—as easily as one would a stone. Indeed, its
theories and principles do not always receive a “ fair hearing” in the agency decision
making process. Courts have supported this unfortunate result by not requiring that
agencies, such as the Forest Service, either consider its principles—and the scientific
evidence that supports them —or apply them.^° This result frequently occurs w hen
questions o f scientific methodology arise.^'
Recall the example in the introduction where a large, undisturbed area o f old

They define biodiversity as “the variety of life and its processes; it includes the variety of living
organisms, the genetic differences among them, the communities and ecosystems in which they occur,
and the ecological and evolutionary processes that keep them functioning, yet ever changing and
adapting.” NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 389.
Believing that no science is value fi'ee, they contend that the greatest objectivity in science comes
fi-om stating biases, values, interests, predilections, and goals up fi-ont. Noss, supra note 7, at 893. See
also FUTUYAMA, supra note 12, at 164 (1983) (stating that since “scientists can be just as biased,
subjective, and foolish as anyone else, why should we have any belief in what they say? The answer:
Scientists are motivated not only by a quest for knowledge but a quest for reputation, and there is no
better way for a scientist to achieve reputation than to demolish existing ideas by finding contrary
evidence, or to propose a theory that explains the evidence better”).
See Noss, supra note 7, at 895.
See Patricia S. King, Applying Daubert to the "Hard Look" Requirement o f NEPA: Scientific
Evidence Before the Forest Service in Sierra Club v. Marita, 2 Wis. L. Rev, 147, 151(1995).
See generally Marita, 43 F.3d 606; Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest
Service, 88 F.3rd 754, 761 (9th Cir. 1996); But see COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
INCORPORATING BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS INTO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ANALYSIS UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 1-2 (1993) (incorporates
guiding principles o f conservation biology into its recommendations for biodiversity considerations
under NEPA).
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growth was reduced to small, isolated patches. The Forest Service in that instance
decided that the method o f fragmenting the forest into small patches would preserve
biological diversity better than the m ethod o f creating lots o f large reserves. Recall also
that these patches are essentially islands afloat in a sea o f altered land, for this analogy
led scientists to the theory o f island biogeography—developed from studies conducted for
real islands^^—where they applied its predictions to forest patches on the mainland.^^
M ost notably, scientists studying island biogeography developed: (1) the species-area
curve, which states that the num ber o f species within any given area is related to the size
o f that area; and (2) the equilibrium theory, which states, among other things, that the
number o f species living on an island depends on the island's size and its distance from
sources (other islands or the mainland) o f immigrants.^'*
Island biogeography is now a foundational discipline w ithin conservation biology. In
fact, conservation biologists have derived from the theory a num ber o f reserve design
principles and suggest that, if forest m anagers apply them when designing forest reserves,
they can give forest communities, such as old-growth ones, the opportunity to m aintain
viable populations—for one o f the greatest threats to biodiversity is habitat fragmentation.
Conservation biology principles directly address that threat.
Take, for example, conservation biology's principle that “large blocks o f habitat,
containing large populations o f a target species, are superior to small blocks
o f habitat containing small populations.” For years scientists debated the question o f

See generally. Inland Empire, 88 F.3rd 754; Marita, 43 F.3d 606.
See generally ROBERT H. MACARTHUR & EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE THEORY OF ISLAND
BIOGEOGRAPHY (1963) (stating that "the same [island biogeography] principles apply, and will
apply to an accelerating extent in the future, to formerly continuous natural habitats now being
broken up by the encroachment o f civilization). See also NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at
52 (discussing the differences between oceanic islands and terrestrial islands).
QUAMMEN, supra note 1, at 440.
See generally MACARTHUR and WILSON, supra note 23.
See BURGESS and SHARPE, supra note 4. See also Reed F. Noss, A Regional Landscape
Approach to Maintain Diversity, 33 BIOSCIENCE 100-06. (1983); Wilcox and Murphy, supra note 7,
at 879-887 (1985)
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w hether the best way to maintain biodiversity was through protection o f a single large
forest reserve or creation o f several small ones (SLOSS debate)/^ Scientists, who earlier
were on opposing sides o f the debate, came to the consensus that the best way to
promote biological diversity was by creating lots o f large forest reserves.^’ Hence, the
“bigness” and ‘m ultiplicity” principles emerged?^ The Forest Service, however,
oftentimes fails to consider or apply such principles w hen designing reserves. Rather, it
continues to provide for diversity by converting large, undisturbed areas o f forest into
small scattered ones, and courts regularly defer to the agency w hen these scientific
methodology issues arise.^^
But conservation biologists are political, yet another aspect that distinguishes them
from other scientists. Instead o f allowing its principles— and the scientific evidence
supporting them— to fall to the wayside, conservation biologists continually promote
their use. It is m any o f these principles, referred to as “reserve design” principles, that
courts are reluctant to require agencies to consider or apply. Listed below are some o f
the essential ones.^®

(1)

(2)

Species well distributed across their native range are less
susceptible to extinction than species confined to small portions
o f their range—m ultiplicity principle;^"
Large blocks o f habitat, containing large populations o f a target
species, are superior to small blocks o f habitat containing small
populations -bigness principle;

See generally QUAMMEN, supra note 1, at 457-545.
” See Soule and Simberloff, supra note 2, at 32.
Id.
See. e.g., Sierra Club v. Marita (“Marita I”), 843 F.Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D.Wis. 1994).
See Noss, supra note 7 at, 899-905. See also NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 141.
The more widely distributed a species, the more unlikely it will be to experience a
catastrophe, disturbance, or other negative influence across its entire range at once. Thus, it can
relocate to areas in its home range that have not been destroyed and from those réfugia, recolonize the
areas where it has been eliminated. This rule corresponds to the “multiplicity principle.” See Noss,
supra note 7, at 900.
This rule corresponds to the “bigness principle. It states that under similar conditions, a large
population will be less vulnerable to extinction than a small one, as a large block o f habitat will usually
contain a larger population. Id. at 901.
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(3)

Blocks o f habitat close together are better than blocks far apart;”

(4)

Habitat in continuous blocks is better than fragmented habitat;”

(5)

Interconnected blocks o f habitat are better than isolated blocks;

^^and
(6)

Blocks o f habitat that are roadless or otherwise inaccessible to
humans are better than roaded and accessible habitat blocks/^

Other forest reserve elements should be considered as well, such as core reserves and
buffer zones.^^ Thus, a model reserve network would consist o f lots o f large core
reserves, connecting corridors or linkages, and multiple-use buffer zones (see fig. 1).

Matrix
Outer Buffer

Reserve

Inter-Regional Corridor

FIGURE 1.

This rule facilitates the exchange o f individuals between two patches that may not otherwise occur if
a large barrier, such as a highway, were in the way. If enough interchange occurs, the two populations
may unite into one large one, making it less vulnerable to extinction. Id. at 901.
” Fragmentation reduces the size o f the habitat and increases its isolation. The theory of island
biogeography predicts that the small and isolated patch will have a smaller population than a large one
and is less likely to be colonized or recolonized by target species after a disturbance, thereby increasing
its chance of extinction from the area. Id. at 901-02.
” This rule states that habitats functionally connected (measured according to the potential for
movement and population interchange o f target species) are less subject to extinctions, particularly
when the corridor resembles that of the target species habitat Id. at 902-03.
Roads enable humans to access areas otherwise inaccessible, except on foot and lead to high
mortality rates for certain species. Id. at 903.
” See NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 147-48 (stating that core reserves are the backbone
of a regional reserve system, and defining a multiple use buffer zone as a zone that permits a greater
range of human uses than core reserves but is still managed with native biodiversity as a preeminent
concern. Because its allowable uses are less intense than in the general landscape matrix, the buffer
zone should serve to shield or insulate core reserves from harmful activities. Without strictly protected
areas representing most of a region's biodiversity, losses are inevitable).
8
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These reserve design principles are the best supported ones conservation biology
has to offer.^* Yet, scientific principles, no m atter how well supported, retain a
probabilistic character. Though we may wish that probabilistic statements will
eventually be replaced by firm declarations, it is evident that the more we learn about our
ecosystems, “the more we recognize our profound i g n o r a n c e . T h u s , courts as well
agency decision makers, lawyers, and legislators, must accept that science is inherently
uncertain and instead seek to distinguish between those scientific theories and principles
that contain indicia o f reliability from those that do not.

III.

DAUBERT: Admissibility of Scientific Evidence

The Supreme Court, in Daubert v. M errell D ow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,^^ set forth a
two-prong test for courts to use when determining w hether or not scientific evidence is
admissible and ought to be considered by the jury. According to the Supreme Court, the
trial judge's role is that o f a “gatekeeper,” one who permits the jury to consider only that
scientific evidence which has been screened for reliability and relevance.'*' The reliability
criteria judges are to consider are: testability/falsifiability, peer review and publication,
general acceptance, and rate o f error."^ To be relevant, the evidence must be sufficiently
tied to both the issue in question and the facts o f the case."^ The Court characterized this
link as “fit.”
Although these factors were developed for trial court judges to use w hen deciding
whether scientific evidence is admissible in court, judges can practicably apply them to
an administrative record review o f an agency decision as well.'*^ Indeed, the agency
could be placed in a position similar to that o f jurors. In other words, a reviewing court
David S. Wilcove and Dennis D. Murphy, The Spotted Owl Controversy and Conservation Biology.
5 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 261 -62 ( 1991).
See Noss, supra note 7, at 908-09.
509 U.S, 579 (1993) (Daubert I).
Id. at 592-93.
Id. at 593-98.
at 591.
See Patricia S. King, supra note 19, at 156.

9
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would ensure that the agency, in reaching its decision, considered all and only that
scientific evidence which is reliable and relevant. The agency, however, would be free to
choose among alternative courses o f action, so long as each course m et the minimum
standard for admissibility. This suggested review will be discussed m ore in Section B o f
this Part, and examples o f how to apply it will be provided in Parts IV through VI. But,
for now, I will review the Daubert case and its two-prong analysis.

A.

Daubert'. A T w o-P rong Review
The prim ary issue in Daubert was w hether the com m on law Frye test controlled the

admission o f scientific evidence or whether the rules o f evidence had replaced it.'*^ To be
admissible under the Frye test, scientific evidence upon which expert testimony was
based had to be generally accepted within the scientific community.'** Otherwise, the
court would exclude it. It was unclear what the rules o f evidence required.
In Daubert, two minor children claim ed that the m om ing-sickness pill. Bénédictin,
caused their birth defects."*’ To support their claim, the plaintiffs attempted to place an
expert on the stand to testify as to a causal link."** The federal trial court, however,
excluded the testimony o f their expert, finding that the scientific testimony linking
Bénédictin to birth defects did not have general acceptance in the field to which it
belonged."*^ The N inth Circuit Court o f Appeals affirmed the trial court ruling and granted
summary judgm ent in favor o f the defendant. The plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court
and it granted certiorari to determine the proper standard for admitting expert testimony
in a federal trial.
The Supreme Court interpreted the applicable rule o f evidence as requiring a flexible,

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 586.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 582.
« Id. at 584.
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two-pronged standard by which trial courts in the first prong assess the reliability o f the
proffered evidence, and, in the second prong, its relevance/'' In doing so, the Court
abandoned the Frye test. The evidentiary rule the Court relied upon s ta te s /'

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
o f fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form o f an opinion or otherwise, (emphasis added)

First, the Court found that when the drafters used the words “scientific” and
“knowledge” together, they created a standard o f evidentiary reliability and, hence,
the first prong.^^ The Court then made it clear that “the [reliability] inquiry is a flexible
one, and its focus m ust be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions
that they generate”^^ It then articulated four criteria, as noted above, that courts can
apply when determining scientific reliability.
Second, the Court interpreted the language, “assist the trier o f fact,” as establishing
the second prong— relevance o f the proffered evidence.^'* Again, in order to establish
relevance under this prong, a court must find that the appropriate “fit” exists between the
testimony, the issue in question, and the facts o f the case.^^
The Court's decision made it clear that the wholesale exclusion under a general
acceptance test was no longer appropriate.^^ Instead, a trial court judge must now act as
a “gatekeeper” to ensure that all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is both
Id. at 593-98.
" Id. at S88.
” Id. at 590 (finding that “the adjective 'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science,” and that the “word 'knowledge' connotes more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation.” In accordance with this evidentiary rule, the Court held that the “proposed
testimony must be supported by appropriate validation, i.e., “good grounds” based on what is known.’
Thus “[i]n a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific
validity”).
” Id. at 594.
^ Id. at 591.
at 591.
Id. at 587.
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reliable and relevant.^^ In other words, w hen faced with a proffer o f expert scientific
testimony, the trial judge, in making the initial determination w hether to admit the
evidence, must determine (1) whether the expert's testimony reflects “ scientific
knowledge,” and (2) whether it will assist the trier o f fact to understand or determine a
material fact at issue/^
O n remand, the N inth Circuit found that the scientific evidence supporting the
expert's assertion lacked general acceptance and had never been peer reviewed or
published-except in the pages o f federal and state reporters. M oreover, it found that the
expert offered no tested or testable theory to explain the causal link between Bénédictin
and birth defects, though even if the expert had, the court stated that it would not have
been relevant. The expert's testimony would have shown that Bénédictin does not double
the likelihood o f birth defects—as required by the court—and would, therefore, not prove
causation. The court then excluded the expert's testimony,^’
Since then, the Ninth Circuit has reiterated that this Daubert duty requires the
court to judge the reasoning used in forming an expert conclusion and not the conclusion
itself. “ So, if scientific testimony satisfies Daubert's two requirements,^' then it is a
matter for the finder o f fact to decide what weight to accord such testimony.^^ For
instance, “in arriving at a conclusion, the factfinder may be confronted with opposing
experts, additional tests, experiments, and publications, all o f which may increase or
lessen the value o f the expert's testimony. But their presence should not preclude the
admission o f the expert's testimony—they go to the weight, not the admissibility.”^^

1. D AU BERTS

To establish reliability under the first prong, a court should consider the following:
at 592-93.
"
Id. at 592; see also Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3rd 1226.1228 (9th Cir. 1998).
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc (Daubert II), 43 F.3d at 1317-21(9th Cir. 1995).
“ See Collagen 161 F.3rd 1226, at 1230.
Id. at 1230-31.
Id. at 1230-31.
«/rf. at 1230-31.
12

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

(1) testability,
(2) peer review and publication,
(3) known or potential rate o f error, and
(4) general acceptance.^"

The Ninth Circuit Court o f Appeals has repeatedly stated that a district court's inquiry under
Daubert is a flexible one,^^ emphasizing that these factors are illustrative, not exhaustive.*’^
In other words, Daubert's standard for determining admissibility o f scientific evidence does
not require a trial court to use a strict “checklist” to determine suitability of testimony, and
the court is not required to automatically exclude relevant evidence if one o f the listed
conditions is not fully satisfied.*^
VnàQX Daubert's reliability prong, a court should first consider whether a theory can
be tested, that is, whether it generates falsifiable hypotheses,*’* for scientific knowledge
progresses not by proving, but by disproving.*^ In fact, “this methodology is what
distinguishes science from other fields o f human inquiry.”™ But what exactly is a theory? A
theory emerges out of the following methodology. Alternative hypotheses are offered to
explain a certain phenomenon. Each hypothesis is then rigorously tested and those that are
disproved are eliminated. What is left is the best available explanation for a given
phenomenon—the theory.’' In sum, theories are the facts of science, for facts are merely

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, See also Daubert JI, 43 F.3d at 1316.
See, e.g., Desrosiers v. Flight Intern, o f Florida Inc., 156 F.3rd 952 (9th Cir. 1998); Cabrera v.
Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d225, 228
(9th Cir. 1997); Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996).
Daubert II. 43 F.3d at 1317.
Desrosier, 156 F.3d 952.
Daubert, 509 U.S at 593.
See King, supra note 19, at 150. See also FUTUYAMA, supra note 12, at 167 (1983).
™Daubert, 509 U.S at 593.
See King, supra note 19, at 150 (1995). See also FUTUYAMA, supra note 12, at 169 (1983) (stating
that "a scientific theory can be corroborated by observations that accord with its predictions, that can be
falsified by observations or experiments which are incompatible with the theory, and that relies on
objective observations that can be repeated by trained, unbiased observers).
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hypotheses that are well-supported by available evidence.’^
To be falsifiable simply means that the theory “specifically predicts that certain
observations, if made, would prove the theory w r o n g . F o r example, if you stated that
ghosts cause blindness in dogs, there would be no possible way for me to prove your
theory wrong.’'* First, I would be unable to detect such ghosts. Second, if they acted
arbitrarily, I would be unable to make predictions about which dogs will or will not go
b l i n d . I n d e e d , “the hallm ark o f nonscientific theories is that they cannot be falsified.”’^
Thus, one must “not demand that every scientific statement m ust have in fact been tested
before it is accepted . . . only dem and that every such statement m ust be capable o f being
tested.””
The second consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subjected to
peer review and publication.’® Research that is accepted for publication in a reputable
scientific journal after having been subjected to the rigors o f peer review is a significant
indication that other scientists take it seriously.’^ In fact, the scientific community will
reject a work for a num ber o f reasons, including “insufficient data, erroneous methods,
improper use o f statistics, [or] unwarranted deductions from the data.®° Moreover, the
integrity o f this review process is guaranteed by, among other things, the simple fact that
“every scientist's research depends on the research o f others in the field; so out o f pure
self-interest, every scientist scrutinizes the work o f others carefully, to be sure it is

” See FUTUYAMA, supra note 12, at 166.
at 168.

KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 48 (Routledge 1992) (1959): see
also King, supra note 19, at 150 (finding that the Forest Service's contention that diversity is a
function o f the diversity o f habitats was circular and, therefore, could not generate a testable
prediction).
Daubert I, 509 U.S. 593-94 (stating that it is relevant, though not dispositive. Rather it is a
component because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected).
See e.g., Collagen, 161 F.3rd at 1228-29.
Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1318.
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reliable.”*'
In addition, the N inth Circuit requires that publication occur in a generallyrecognized scientific journal that conditions publication on a bona fide process o f peer
review.*^ It does acknowledge, however, that well-grounded but innovative theories may
not have been published and, thus, should not be excluded on this basis a lo n e .I n s te a d ,
the fact o f publication (or lack thereof) in a peer-reviewed journal is relevant to the
reliability consideration, though not dispositive.*"
The third consideration is the known or potential rate o f error. This faetor is
applicable to specific measurement techniques, such as voice identification techniques
and polygraph tests. It m ay also be applicable to certain scientific protocols.*^ A high
rate o f error would indicate unreliability.
The final consideration is whether the theory or technique is generally accepted. As
noted above, this was the sole consideration under the Frye test. Though wholesale
exclusion under this test has been abandoned, widespread acceptance can be an
important factor in ruling whether or not particular evidence is admissible,*® as a “known
technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within the community
m ay properly be viewed with skepticism.”*’ It should also be noted that a reliability
assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification o f a relevant
scientific community and an express determination o f a particular degree o f acceptance

See King, supra note 19, at 152 (1995). See also FUTUYAMA, supra note 12, at 165.
FUTUYAMA, supra note 12, at 164.
Daubert //, 43 F.3d at 1318 n.6.
Collagen, 161 F.3rd at 1228; Daubert I, 590 U.S. at 593.
Daubert /, 590 U.S. at 594. But see Lust, 89 F.3d at 597 (stating that if these guarantees of
reliability are not satisfied, the expert 'must explain precisely how [she] went about reaching
[her] conclusions and point to some objective source . . . to show that [she has] followed the scientific
method, as it is practiced by (at least) a recognized minority of scientists in [her] field").
See Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Pilchuck Audubon Socy, 97 F.3rd 1161 (9th Cir. 1996).
“ See Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d at 1418 (9th Cir. 1998).
Daubert 1, 590 U.S. at 594.
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within that community.**

2.

D AU BERTS SECOND PRONG
The second prong under Daubert requires a judge to ensure that the proposed expert

testimony will “assist the trier o f fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.” Thus, if evidence is found to be reliable, but not relevant, it m ust be excluded.*^
Although the Court stated that the focus o f a relevancy review m ust be solely on
principles and methodology, and not on the conclusions that they generate,^® “nothing . .
. requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to the existing
data only by the ipse dixit [arbitrary statement] o f the expert.” A court m ay conclude that
there is simply too great an analytical gap betw een the data and the opinion offered.”®'
The Court in Daubert also acknowledged that scientific evidence is inherently
uncertain and that, to be relevant, it need not be established to a high degree o f certainty.
In fact, the Court stated “ [i]t would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject o f
scientific testimony m ust be 'known' to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in
science.”®^ Expanding on this language, the N inth Circuit stated that “ [n]ot knowing the
mechanism whereby a particular agent causes a particular effect is not always fatal to a
plaintiffs claim. Causation can be proved even when we don't know precisely how the
damage occurred [or will occur], if there is sufficiently compelling p ro o f that the agent
must have caused [or will cause] the damage somehow.”®^

B.

TWO-STEP APPROACH: Agency Decision Making
Daubert's two steps would not be difficult for courts to apply when reviewing an

agency's administrative record, as I will demonstrate in Parts IV through VI. Indeed,
when questions o f scientific methodology arise in environmental cases, courts should not

See e.g., Desrosier, 156 F.3d 952.

U.S.

V.

Scholl 166 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 1999); Daubert //, 43 F.3d at 1315.

Collagen ,161 F.3rd at 1228.

” Joiner v. General Electric Co., 522 U.S. 136 (1997). See also Collagen , 161 F.3rd at 1228
Collagen, 161 F.3rd at 1230; see also Daubert /, 509 U.S. at 590.
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autom atically defer to the agency, as the method selected to achieve specific diversity
goals may not be supported by scientifically reliable or relevant evidence. Unless courts
conduct meaningful reviews o f these agency decisions, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for them to ensure that agency decisions are consistent w ith legislative
aims.^" Thus, the Daubert factors ought to guide courts in their analysis o f the
administrative record to ensure that agencies’ scientific decisions com port with the law
and its underlying purposes.
W hen reviewing an agency's decision to see w hether or not it is based on reliable
and relevant scientific evidence, a court should ask these two questions that were first
proposed by Patricia King.^^

(1)

Is the evidence reliable?
If it is, it should be considered by the agency. I f not, it should not
be considered.

(2)

Did the agency consider all o f the reliable and relevant evidence
presented to it before making a decision?

In answering the first question, a reviewing court should apply the Daubert criteria to
determine whether the scientific evidence is reliable. The court m ust then ensure that the
agency considered only and all that scientific evidence which is reliable and relevant.
This second step places a duty on agency decision-makers to make a good faith effort to
diligently seek out all such evidence and ensures that the agency answers evidence that
contradicts its views.®^
N ote, too, that this two-step approach is not being proposed to force the agency to

Collagen, 161 F.3rd at 1228; see a h a Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1314.
See generally Robert L. Glicksman, A Retreat from Judicial Activism: The Seventh Circuit and the
Environment, 63 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 209 (1987).
See King, supra note 19, at 156-57.
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adopt one scientific approach over another. Instead, it is being proposed to ensure that
valid scientific principles, such as those o f conservation biology, are given a
“ fair hearing.” If contradicting views withstand the two-step scrutiny and are properly
considered, then the court should defer to the agency's choice o f how to proceed in light
o f such evidence. By following this approach, the court can empower an agency to
consistently make informed policy choices. This suggested two-part review is consistent
with the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron.

IV.

Chevron: A Principle of Deference

In Chevron, the Supreme Court devised a two-step analytical approach for courts to
follow when reviewing an agency's interpretation o f a statutory provision. In this part, I
review that approach as well as the N inth Circuit's interpretation o f it. Focusing on a
recent N inth Circuit case, I argue that a two-step Daubert review—when applied to
questions o f scientific methodology—is com patible w ith Chevron's principle o f
deference. This principle states that an agency’s interpretation o f an ambiguous statutory
provision it administers is entitled to deference, so long as it is reasonable.’’
The importance o f conducting a Daubert review in this context lies in the fact
that when Congress passes an environmental statute and leaves an area ambiguous
because o f its scientific complexity, it is delegating authority to the agency to make a
policy choice. It is difficult to imagine, however, that Congress' delegation entitles the
agency to use unreliable scientific evidence— where it would risk undermining the
objectives a particular statute was enacted to achieve, such as protecting threatened
species— when m aking that choice. Thus, a two-step Daubert review would serve as a
check on the agency decision-making process to ensure that an agency's interpretation o f
a statutory provision is truly reasonable and consistent with Congressional intent.

See id. at 157.
” Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2105
( 1990)(stating that the reasonableness inquiry should probably be seen as similar to the inquiry into
whether the agency's decision is arbitrary or capricious with the meaning o f the APA. That inquiry
requires the agency to give a detailed explanation o f its decision by reference to relevant factors).
18
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A.

Chevron 's Two-part Analytical Approach
The question for the Court in Chevron was whether the EPA's plantwide

definition o f “source” violated the Clean A ir Act.’* Under this Act, the EPA was required
to establish a permit program for “new or modified major stationary sources” o f air
pollution in “nonattainment” states.” The EPA had defined “source” to mean any
pollution-em itting device in a p l a n t . T h u s , if a plant had twenty such devices, it would
have to obtain a perm it for each o f them. However, in 1981, the EPA revised its
definition.

A “ source” under the new definition was not each individual device, rather

it was the entire plant. So when a plant modified or installed a new device, a permit
would be required only if the amount o f pollution emitted by the entire facility increased.
The EPA's new definition was termed the “bubble concept.” To decide whether the
concept violated the Clean Air Act, the Court created and applied a two-part analytical
approach for resolving issues o f statutory interpretation;
(1 )

Courts must ask w hether Congress has directly addressed the precise
question at issue.'®^ If Congress’ intent”’'' is clear, the court and agency

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.

42 U.S.C. 7502(b)(6).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 858.
See 40 C.F.R. 51.165(a)(!)(i)-(ii) (1989).
See Chevron, 467 U.S. 842-44.
See Conlan v. United States Dept, of Labor, 76 F.3d at 274 (9th Cir. 1996).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (stating that if a court, employing traditional tools o f statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is
the law and must be given effect). See also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations o f Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511,515 (1989): seg ako Forest Guardians, 131 F.3d at 1309
(quoting Seldovia Native Ass’n, Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1990)(a court can discern
Congressional intent “by looking to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language
and design of the statute as a whole’’); Sierra Club v. United States Forest Service, n.93 F.3d 610, 612
(9th Cir. 1996) (stating that only if the language and text are ambiguous, however, does the court
consider statutory history); Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan (Squirrel 11) 954 F.2d 1441, 1453 (9""
Cir. 1992)(stating that “[l[t is naïve, or disingenuous, to suggest that courts should not consider
legislative history when attempting to determine the meaning o f statutes’’).
Forest Guardians, 131 F.3d at 1312. But see Rainsong Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 106 F.3d 269, 273 (9th Cir. 1996)(stating that the Court will accept an [agency's]
interpretation only if it is compatible with Congress' clear intent as expressed by the plain meaning of
the statute.); American Tunaboat Association v. Brown, 67 F.3d 1401,1408-09 (9th Cir. 1995)(stating
that a court must “interpret language in one section o f a statute consistently with language o f other
sections and with the purposes of the entire statute considered as a whole. In fact, the court will refrain
from resorting to an unduly literal interpretation of a statutory provision when to do so would
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must give effect to the unam biguously expressed intent o f Congress.
(2)

But if Congress was silent or ambiguous as to the precise question at
issue, then a court must determine if the agency's interpretation is a
reasonable'®^ one. If it is, a court must defer.

Applying the two-step approach to the facts, the Court found that neither the statute
nor its legislative history addressed the issue o f whether Congress intended “source” to
mean the entire plant or each pollution-emitting device. The Court then asked w hether
the agency's “bubble concept” was a reasonable interpretation o f source,” and ultim ately
held that it was, for the agency's definition “represent[ed] a reasonable accommodation
o f manifestly competing interests.” '®'' In fact, the agency had provided for reasonable
economic growth and served the environmental objective o f controlling air pollution. Its
interpretation was, therefore, entitled to deference.'®^ Chevron's principle o f deference
was bom.
The N inth Circuit, in interpreting Chevron, has declared that an agency's
interpretation o f a legislative delegation is entitled to deference,'®® particularly where
that interpretation involves agency expertise."® The question for a court, however, is still
whether the agency's interpretation is based on a permissible or reasonable construction
o f the statute, even if it is not the best o n e ,"' as “the judiciary is the final authority on

eviscerate the clear intent o f Congress); United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d I I 70,1174 (9th Cir.
1998)(stating that an interpretation that offends the statute's essential purpose will not be upheld). See
also Sunstein, supra note 97, at 2092 (stating that the mere fact o f a plausible alternative view is
insufficient to trigger the Chevron rule. No verbal formulation will be completely helpful here, relying
as it must on undefined defining terms. But perhaps this will do: if the court has a firm conviction that
the agency interpretation violates the statute, that interpretation must fail. This is so even If a
reasonable person might accept the agency's view).
'“ See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter o f Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 115 S.Ct.
2407, 2416 (1995) (finding that the Act's text, legislative history and purpose supported the
"reasonableness" o f the Secretary's definition o f “harm”).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
Id.
Rainsong, 106 F.3rd at 272.
"'^McKittrick, 142 F.3d at 1175. But see 0 ‘Scanlin dissent (no need to resort to legislative history or

“purpose” arguments when plain language answers the question).
Forest Guardians, 131 F.3d at 1312; see also Pilchuck, 97 F.3rd at 1170 (9th Cir. 1996); Tunaboat,
67 F 3rd at 1409 ( stating that courts must find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to be
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issues o f statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are
contrary to clear congressional intent and that frustrate the purposes o f a statute.” '

This

tension between deference and judicial duty is apparent in Northwest Forest Council v.
PilchuckN^ Notably, the court in that case inquired into the reasonableness o f the
agency's interpretation before deferring to it.

B.

Case In Point; Pilchuck
In Pilchuck, the court combined a Chevron analysis with a scientific

methodology one. The court's opinion, therefore, lends itself well to the discussion o f
whether a two-step D aubert review is consistent with Chevron's deference principle,
particularly when questions o f scientific m ethodology arise. It does not, however,
explicitly involve conservation biology principles. Nevertheless, my intention is that we
will look at the cases reviewed in this article through the lens o f one who understands the
importance o f conservation biology's principles and is com m itted to ensuring they
receive a “fair hearing.” The unquestioned goal o f conservation biology, however, is to
maintain biodiversity, and this case most certainly addresses this issue, albeit through the
identification o f one species' nesting habitat— the marbled murrelet.
At issue in Pilchuck was the 1995 Recission Act's (hereinafter “Act ) “known to
be nesting” requirement,

for the Act directs the secretaries o f agriculture and the

interior to expedite the award o f tim ber harvesting contracts previously authorized by the

imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the general
purposes that Congress manifested); Central Arizona Water Cons. Dist. v. United States Envtl.
Protection Agency, 990 F.2d 1531,1541(9th Cir. 1993) (an agency's interpretation is entitled to
deference if the agency's choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that
were committed to the agency's care by the statute, if it appears from either the statute or legislative
history that the accommodation is one that Congress would have sanctioned).
Forest Guardians, 131 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9 (1984); see also
Rainsong, 106 F,3rd at 277-73 (noting that “[rjeviewing courts . . . must not rubberstamp . . .
administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the
congressional policy underlying a statute. A court may not, however, substitute its own construction o f
a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the agency).
Pilchuk, 91 F.3"'at 1170.
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1989 Northwest Timber Compromise except in the following instances:"^
No sale unit shall be released or completed under this subsection if any threatened
or endangered bird species is known to be n estin g within the acreage that is the subject o f
the sale unit, (emphasis added).
Because the Forest Service was aware that the marbled m urrelet was present in its
proposed sale areas, it was required to make a “known to be nesting’ determ ination."^
Under the Endangered Species Act, the Forest Service was also required to enter into
consultation with the Fish and W ildlife Service (FWS) regarding the effect o f the sales on
the marbled m u rrelet.'" Eventually, the Forest Service concluded that further logging o f
its seventy-seven sale areas would “jeopardize the continued existence” o f the marbled
murrelet, as it was “known to be nesting” in these areas."* The Forest Service's
conclusion was derived from application o f the “PSG Protocol," which enables biologists
to determine whether or not a stand is a nesting one. Biologists identify nesting stands

by:'"'
( 1)

presence o f fecal ring or eggshell fragments;

(2)

readily observing activity o f birds flying in, out or through
the canopy; or

(3)

readily observing birds circling directly over or under the
canopy.

The plaintiff contended, however, that use o f the “PSG Protocol” was not a reasonable
interpretation o f the “known to be nesting” requirement.'^" Rather, it argued that a
determination o f “nesting” was reasonable only if there was physical evidence, such as

""M at 1164,
M at 1164-65.
at 1168.
"’ W. at 1167.
'" M at 1167.
""M at 1169.
™ Id. atll68.
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eggshell fragments, fecal rings or dead chicks, present on or below a tree.'*'
To resolve the issue, the court applied Chevron’s two-step analytical approach
and first looked at the plain language o f section 200 l(k) (2). It determ ined that the
section did not require that a nest be “found.”

Instead, the court interpreted the phrase

“known to be nesting,” so as to allow a range o f nesting activity to be considered.
Turning from a textual analysis to a legislative history one, the court found that the “PSG
Protocol” was never m entioned in the Act and that Congress took no scientific testimony
on the issue o f how to make a “known to be nesting determ ination.” '^"’ Acknowledging
that the legislative history failed to address what “known to be nesting” meant, the court
stated that “it is exactly this type o f [unclear or ambiguous] legislation, aimed at
administrative agencies o f government, for which Chevron requires deference to agency
biologists' expertise.” '^^
The issue for the N inth Circuit, then, was whether the Forest Service's
employment o f the “PSG Protocol” was a reasonable interpretation o f the “known to be
nesting” requirement.'^^ In making its determination, the court acknowledged that the
“PSG Protocol” was “the generally accepted scientific methodology employed to
determine whether marbled murrelets are located in, or m aking use of, a particular inland
forested site for nesting purposes.” '^’ It also noted, among other things, that the agency's
experts had found that no other reliable, scientifically accepted and tested method for
identifying nest stands existed.'^* The court then stated that “the location and

'*' Id. at 1168.
at 1169.
M at 1169.
'""M at 1167.
M a t 1168.
at 1169.
'*"M at 1167.
'**M at 1169.
M at 1170.
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determination o f what birds are doing in which location is the type o f program that has to
be designed and implemented by agency experts unless there is clear Congressional intent
to the contrary.” '^’ It then concluded by declaring that the agency’s use o f the protocol
was "a reasonable interpretation o f the statute.”
Pilchuck demonstrates that rather than deferring to an agency's interpretation o f a
statutory provision, the court is willing to inquire into w hether an agency's choice o f
scientific methodology is based upon reliable scientific evidence. Because the evidence
indicated the “PSG Protocol” was reliable, the court did not have to decide whether it
would have been unreasonable to use a scientifically m ethod that was not. But the court
indicated it could.

C. Pilchuck and the Daubert Factors
Before concluding that the “PSG Protocol” was a reasonable interpretation o f the
“known to be nesting” requirement, the court considered all four o f the Daubert factors.
Though it did not explicitly state that it was doing so, the thrust o f the opinion was that
the “PSG Protocol” was a scientifically reliable method for detecting marbled murrelet
nesting stands and was, therefore, a reasonable interpretation under Chevron.
The following chart summarizes the scientific evidence before the court in Pilchuck
and is an example o f how the court could have explicitly conducted a two-step Daubert
review.

TWO-STEP DA UBERT REVIEW

The plaintiff and defendant differed in what factors they contended were important in
making a “known to be nesting” determination. Because the court considered only
evidence regarding the “PSG Protocol,” I will be unable to chart evidence regarding the
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plaintiffs contention. However, if the court were to conduct a two-step Daubert review,
it would review the evidence supporting both the plaintiffs and defendant's contentions.

FIRST STEP:
W hether the “PSG Protocol” is a reliable scientific method o f detecting nesting
stands? If it is, it should be considered by the agency. If not, it should not be considered.
W hether the Northwest Forest Council's contention is a reliable scientific
method of detecting nesting stands? If it is, it should be considered by the agency. If
not, it should not be considered.

P lain tiffs Contention

D efendant’s Contention

Nesting stands can be determined
only by physical evidence
such as eggshell fragments
fecal rings or dead chicks
present on or below
a tree.

Nesting stands can be determined
by the num ber and character o f
murrelet detections in a particular
tree stand.

DA UBERT FACTORS
(A) TESTABILITY/FALSIBILITY:

Plaintiff
The contention is falsifiable with
the observation that a physical
determination alone does not
identify most nesting stands.

Defendant
The contention is falsifiable with
the observation that the “PSG
Protocol” does not distinguish
nesting and breeding activities
from mere presence in a particular
stand o f trees.
The court also noted that agency
biologists have tested the protocol
and found it to be reliable.

(B) PEER REVIEW AND PUBLICATION

Plaintiff

Defendant

No inquiry

The authors o f the protocol were
appointed by the Pacific Seabird
Group (PSG), a professional

Includes: detection of an active nest or recent nest by a fecal ring or eggshell fragments, the more
readily observed activity o f birds flying in, out or through the canopy; or circling directly over or under
the canopy.
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scientific organization which takes
a lead role in coordinating and
promoting research on marbled
m urrelet.’^’
(C) GENERAL ACCEPTANCE

Plaintiff

Defendant

No inquiry

Court stated that this protocol is
the generally accepted scientific
methodology employed to determine
whether marbled m urrelet are located in,
or making use of, a particular inland
forested site for nesting purposes.
Court also noted: (1) survey data collected
pursuant to the protocol was considered
the best available scientific information
upon which to base a determination o f
w hether murrelets were known to be
nesting in a sale unit;
and (2)for the past
five years, the FS and the FWS and
independent scientists have accepted the
“occupancy” determination under the PSG
protocol as the criterion for establishing
nesting use o f forested stands.'^'*

(D) RATE OF ERROR

Plaintiff

Defendant

No inquiry

Evidence in the record indicates that the
determ inations under the protocol are 95100% accurate in predicting nesting
behavior.

SECOND STEP

Did the agency consider all o f the reliable and relevant evidence presented
to it before making a decision.
(A) RELEVANCE:
Pilchuck. 97 F.3dat 1167 n.l.
''-M at 1167.
‘--'M at 1169.
at 1169.
M at 1169.
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The “PSG protocol” is sufficiently tied to the issue in question and the
facts o f the case, as it was designed particularly for locating marbled
murrelet nesting sites.

m i CONSIDERED ALL AND ONLY RELIABLE AND RELEVANT
EVIDENCE:

The court noted that the “PSG Protocol” was the only scientifically tested
and reliable method for determ ining nesting stands. Thus the Forest
Service in this case would not have been required to consider other
methods.

In Pilchuck, the Forest Service em ployed a scientific methodology that would
likely withstand scrutiny under a two-step Daubert review. The first criterion o f
reliability under Daubert is testability or falsifiability. The Forest Service’s contention
was that marbled murrelet nesting stands could be located by the number and character o f
murrelet detections in a particular tree stand. This contention generated predictions that
could be falsified if certain observations were made.
For instance, a scientist could demonstrate that the protocol's predictions were
incorrect by showing that the presence o f fecal rings or eggshell fragments, the activity o f
birds flying in, out or through the canopy, and birds circling directly over or under the
canopy, does not distinguish a m urrelet nesting stand from mere presence. Yet, no such
showing was made. Rather, the court found that biologists had tested the predictions “in
developing the protocol, [and had analyzed] various types o f murrelet behavior to
distinguish nesting and breeding activities from mere presence in a particular stand o f
trees,” and found it to be reliable. The plaintiff also generated predictions that could be
tested and would withstand scrutiny under the first criterion, though no more inquiries
into the plaintiffs contention were made.
The second criterion is peer review and publication. Here, the court noted that
“the authors o f the protocol were appointed by the Pacific Seabird Group (PSG), a
27
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professional scientific organization which takes a lead role in coordinating and promoting
research on marbled murrelet.” ' B y acknowledging this fact, the court implied that the
author's work was reliable. For instance, the authors were appointed by a legitimate
professional organization. Credibility o f such organization depends, in large part, on the
credibility o f the scientists it employs and the integrity o f their scientific research. In
order to maintain a reputation as a leader in m arbled m urrelet research, it would be in the
best interest o f the organization to ensure that these scientists produce high quality work,
which can be achieved through a peer review process that scrutinizes their work for
substantive flaws. A court, however, ought to inquire into whether such a process in fact
exists and then examine the standards that guide it. Even if a bona fide peer review
process were in place, a court ought to also consider whether the findings were published.
Publication is an important element o f peer review .'” Thus, if the authors o f the “PSG
Protocol” had not published their findings in a reputable scientific journal, a court ought
to ask why, as an author's “readiness to publish and be dam ned” is the ultimate test o f
scientific i n t e g r i t y . T h e Supreme Court acknowledged, however, that well-grounded
but innovative theories may not have been published and should not be excluded on this
basis a l o n e , p a r t i c u l a r l y if a bona fide process o f peer review was in place.
If neither peer review nor publication were present, however, the Ninth
Circuit would require the “PSG Protocol's” authors to precisely explain how they went
about reaching their conclusions and would require them to point to some objective
source to show they had followed the scientific method as it is practiced by at least a
recognized minority o f scientists.

Though peer review and publication are relevant to

M at 1167 n.l.
' Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 593.
Daubert
F.3d at 1318.
7,509 U.S. at 593.
Lust, F.3d at 597.
Daubert I, 5QZ U.S. at 594.
Pilchuck, 97 F.3d at 1167.
Id. at 1169.
""W. at 1169.
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the reliability consideration, they are not dispositive.'^' A court must use its informed
discretion when deciding the correct weight to assign the existence o f peer review and
publication (or lack thereof) and should use the other Daubert factors to help guide it in
its reliability determination.
The third criterion is general acceptance. The court explicitly recognized the agency's
satisfaction o f this criterion, as it stated that “this protocol is the generally accepted
scientific methodology employed to determine w hether marbled m urrelet are located in,
or m aking use of, a particular inland forested site for nesting purposes.” '"*^ It also noted
that for the past five years, the Forest Service, the Fish and W ildlife Service, and
independent scientists have accepted the “occupancy” detennination under the “PSG
Protocol” as the criterion for establishing nesting use o f forested stands.'"^ The protocol
gained widespread acceptance in the scientific com m unity to which it belonged and,
therefore, would satisfy the third criterion.
The final criterion is rate o f error. The court noted that "evidence in the record
indicates that the determinations under the protocol are 95-100% accurate in predicting
nesting behavior.” ''” The Supreme Court recognized this criteria would be most useful
for techniques such as polygraph testing, though it is relevant to the protocol as well,
particularly since such data could be collected. The rate o f error is low and, thus, the
protocol could satisfy this criterion as well.
The “PSG Protocol” would likely withstand scrutiny under the first step o f a
Daubert review. U nder my proposal, however, the court would have also inquired into
whether the plaintiffs suggested methodology was reliable and w hether the Forest
Service had considered other reliable and relevant methods for determining nesting
stands. This determination is important because it w ould enable the court to determine, in
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the second step, whether the Forest Service m eaningfully considered all such evidence.
W ithout doing so, an agency would not be required to answer evidence that contradicted
its view and the court could not be assured that the agency's choice was, in fact,
reasonable. In this case, the court acknowledged that “no other reliable scientifically
accepted and tested method for identifying nest stands” existed."*^ Thus, the Forest
Service's decision would likely stand.

D. Other Interpretive Principles Displace Chevron.
Pilchuck is an example o f where, in the environmental field. Congress is faced with a
complex scientific issue that is beyond its competence, and instead o f prescribing a
particular method. Congress left that decision to the expert, i.e., the Forest Service. Under
Chevron, so long as the method employed is a reasonable interpretation o f a statutory
provision, a court ought to defer to it. But when such an interpretation involves the choice
o f one scientific methodology over another, the court should conduct a two-step Daubert
review to determine its reasonableness. If the agency fails this review, then the court
should find that the agency's interpretation is unreasonable and require it to: (1) re
consider all that scientific evidence which is both reliable and relevant; and (2) to choose
a methodology that is supported by such evidence. In the event that no alternative meets
the Daubert reliability criteria, a court should prevent the agency from acting until a
course o f action is supported by scientific evidence that meets Daubert's minimum
standards.
The constitutional principle o f separation o f powers is not an obstacle to such a
review, even though when Congress leaves an ambiguity in a statute, the resolution o f

Id. at 1169.
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that issue involves a policy c h o i c e . T h e s e choices generally are to be made by the
political branches, not the courts. Yet, courts can consider policy choices. In interpreting
a statute, courts are empowered to employ the “traditional tools o f statutory
construction.” These tools include text, legislative history, and consideration o f policy
consequences.’'*^ In order to prevent irrational or absurd consequences, a court must be
able to consider policy.’'** Courts, therefore, are not required to defer to agencies on such
issues because they lack “constitutional competence to consider and evaluate policy.” ’'*^
Rather, courts defer to an agency’s choice, or ought to, because to do otherwise would
put the court in a position o f selecting an alternative that is “better” than another one that
is also possible.’’” But that is not what I am suggesting. Instead, courts should ensure that
the policy choice the agency does make is based on consideration o f all and only that
scientific evidence which is reliable and relevant. The agency would make the ultimate
choice. In fact, this suggestion is entirely consistent with Chevron, as courts would not
technically be interpreting statutory provisions by conducting a two-step Daubert review.
Rather, they would simply be requiring agencies to use reliable and relevant evidence.
However, even if one were to argue that such a requirement does involve statutory
interpretation and is restricted by Chevron's principle o f deference, my suggestion finds
support in a number o f areas.
For example, other interpretive norms may require that a court reject an agency's
position, even if Congressional intent is unclear.’” For instance, norms designed to

See Laurence H. Silberman, "Chevron—The Intersection o f Law & Policy," 38 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 821(1989) (policy is a "definite course or method o f action selected [as by a government,
institution, group, or individual] from among alternatives . . . to guide and usually determine present
and future decisions); See generally Glicksman, supra note 94.
See Scalia, supra note 104 at 515.
*'** See id.', see also Diarmuid F. O'Scanlin, Current Trends in Judicial Review o f Environmental
Agency Action, 27 Envt'l L. 1 (1997); see generally Sunstein, supra note 97.
See Scalia, supra note 104 at 515; see also O'Scanlin, supra note 148; see Sunstein. supra note
97.
See Scalia, supra note 104 at 515.
’ ” See Sunstein, supra note 97 at 2116-18 (1990).
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counteract administrative or governmental bias, to protect legislative processes, and to
prevent regulatory irrationality may lead to the displacement o f Chevron.'^'" The issue then
becomes whether Chevron will “displace or be displaced” by these other interpretative
norms.
First, interpretative norms used to counteract bias are intended to remedy “systemic
biases in governmental processes . . . and to promote fair dealing.”

These norms can

displace Chevron. Consider the following: in the late 1960's and 1970's, citizens were validly
concerned that the agencies were “captured” by the industries they were entrusted to
regulate.'^'* In fact, that “capture” prevented agencies from placing importance on
environmental protection.'^^ Today, that concern is more tempered because o f the enormous
pressure environmental groups have placed on agencies to foeus not only on industry needs,
but on managing for healthy ecosystems.
Yet, when the Forest Service designs a plan to preserve biodiversity but fails to
consider all and only reliable and relevant scientific evidence when devising the plan—resting
its ultimate decision on unreliable evidence and allowing large amounts o f timber to be
removed— a court ought to view that decision with skepticism. In fact, that situation
implicates the bias norm .'” A court ought to, therefore, conduct a two-step Daubert review
to ensure the decision was not biased, for allowing an agency interpretation to overcome this

M at 2114-19 {\99Q).

M at 2115-16 (1990).
See E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745-48 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Diver,
Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 408-09 (1981)
(describing a 'chorus o f disaffection' in the late 1960's to the 'rank favoritism or obsequiousness
that dominated many agency decisions); Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Government Planning:
Judicial Review and Policy Formulation, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 343 (1966) (Bureaucratic
specialization leads to parochialism, excessive preoccupation o f the agency with its own goals and
its own vision of the public interest, and a disproportionate sacrifice o f other social and economic
interests to those it feels itself commissioned to protect and foster).
See Diver, supra note 154 at 408-09 (1981).
See generally Marita II, 46 F.3rd 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
Sunstein, supra note 97 at 2102 (1990) (stating that the "expression o f these views is
unlikely to be part o f the exercise of authority that has been Congressionally granted. In these cases, an
agency s claim of unmunity from the judiciary could not easily be seen as part o f its delegated
authority).
32

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

norm would be an odd result and a poor reading o f congressional instructions.
Second, norms designed to protect legislative processes in order to increase
rationality and integrity in that process'^ can displace Chevron. Yet, when agency expertise
is at issue, Chevron will often overcome this norm. But it should not overcome it when a
court is reviewing an agency decision to see whether that decision is consistent with likely
interpretative instructions from the legislature.'” It is difficult to imagine that when
Congress passes an environmental statute and leaves an area ambiguous because o f its
scientific complexity, that it is delegating authority to the agency to use unreliable scientific
evidence to interpret its instructions. It is also difficult to imagine that “this choice represents
a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care
by the statute.” "’" Thus, in such a case. Chevron should be displaced and a two-step Daubert
review conducted.
Finally, norms designed to counteract absurd or unjust results can displace
Chevron.'^' Yet, in order for this result to occur, the “absurdity or irrationality” should be
something so obvious that reasonable people could not differ.

Again, it is hard to find a

more patently unreasonable interpretation of a statutory provision than one where an agency
discards reliable scientific evidence and employs a scientific methodology based on
unreliable evidence. In such a case, this norm should displace Chevron.
So when statutes, such as the Recission Act, mandate that the Forest Service prevent
a particular environmental result—such as jeopardizing a species listed under the ESA—it
would be prudent for courts to satisfy themselves that the scientific methodology employed
is based on consideration o f all and only that scientific evidence which is reliable and

at 2116 (1990).
'” /J. at 2115-16 (1990).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
See Sunstein, supra note 97, at 2117-18.
M at 2118 (1990).
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relevant. W ithout this review, courts will neglect their responsibility’“ to ensure that an
agency's interpretation o f a statutory provision is consistent both w ith legislative aims
and with Chevron's reasonableness requirement, thereby enabling the agency to make
im portant scientific methodology choices that are exempt from judicial review.

V.

Reasonable Assumptions
In this part, I examine whether a court should use a two-step Daubert review to

guide them in their analysis o f the administrative record when plaintiffs challenge the
assumptions underlying an agency's decision to employ a particular scientific
methodology. Specifically, I will review the case Inland Empire Public lands v. United
States Forest Service, where the Forest Service conducted only a habitat analysis—rather
than gathering population data on species and considering conservation biology
principles-to discharge its N FM A diversity duty.'“
Similar to the example in the introduction, the Forest Service in Inland Empire
determined how much habitat a species needed to remain viable and proceeded to protect
only those amounts. Indeed, the Forest Service's methodology necessarily assumed that
maintaining an acreage o f habitat greater than that which is necessary for survival would

See Rainsong, supra note 112 at 273; see also Tunaboat, supra note 111, at 1409; Forest
Guardians, 131 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9 (1984))(stating that “the judiciary

is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions
which are contrary to clear Congressional intent and that frustrate the purposes o f a statute”).
Inland Empire, 88 F.3rd 754; The NFMA directs the Secretary o f Agriculture in preparing a forest
management plan to: provide for diversity o f plant and animal communities based on the suitability and
capability o f the specific land area in order to meet overall multiple-use objectives of a land
management plan adopted pursuant to this section, provide, where appropriate, to the degree
practicable, for steps to be taken to preserve the diversity o f tree species similar to that in the region
controlled by the plan. See also Charles F. Wilkinson and FI. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource
Planning in the National Forests, 64 Or. L. Rev 1, 296 (1985). As esteemed Professor Wilkinson
stated, “it is difficult to discern any concrete legal standards from [the] plain language. But “when the
section is read in light o f the historical context and overall purposes of the NFMA, as well as the
legislative history of the section, it is evident that section 6(g)(3)(B) requires Forest Service planners to
treat the wildlife resource as a controlling, co-equal factor in forest management and, in particular, as a
substantive limitation on timber production.”
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in fact assure a specie’s s u r v i v a l . I suggest that plaintiffs specifically challenge
assumptions such as this one and argue, for the scientific reasons discussed in Part II, that
they are not reasonable. A court should then conduct a two-step D aubert review to
determine whether the assumption is in fact reasonable, as the “service is entitled to rely
on reasonable assumptions in its environmental a n a l y s e s , n o t unreasonable ones.
One should realize that this challenge may not trigger the “hard look” doctrine, as
that arises under NEPA. Often, though, plaintiffs bring both a “hard look” challenge and
a NFM A diversity one. This combined approach, however, will be discussed in part VI.

A. Case In Point: Inland Empire
Similar to in Pilchuck, conservation biology principles are not explicitly mentioned in
Inland Empire. Yet, one can again review the case through the lens o f a conservation
biologist, as the case debates what type o f data m ust be gathered in order to provide for
and maintain biodiversity.
In Inland Empire, the question for the court was what type o f population viability
analyses was the Forest Service required to c o n d u c t . I n other words, could the Forest
Service discharge its diversity duty, embodied in regulation 219.19, through habitat
analysis alone. The environmental plaintiffs contended that it could not.'*’* They argued
that, in addition to a habitat analysis, the Forest Service was required to examine the
species' population size, their population trends, and their ability to interact with other groups
o f the species living in neighboring patches o f f o r e s t . B e c a u s e it did not conduct such an
analysis, the plaintiffs argued, the Forest Service violated the NFMA.
The Forest Service, on the other hand, argued that it could discharge its substantive

Inland Empire, 88 F.3rd at 761 (9th Cir. 1996).
'^M a( 761.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 760.
M at 760.
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duty solely through habitat analyses, relying on the assumption that maintaining more
acreage o f habitat than is necessary for survival would in fact assure a specie’s survival.’™
The Forest Service conducted the following habitat analysis:'^’
(1) consulted field studies that disclosed how many acres o f territory an
individual o f each species needed to survive and the percentage o f that
acreage that was used for nesting, feeding, and denning, etc.;

(2) assumed that these percentages would hold true regardless of the size of
the individual's territory;

(3) examined each proposed alternative to see how many acres o f each type
of relevant habitat would remain after the timber was harvested;

(4)

determined what percentage o f the decision area that the remaining

types o f habitat constituted;

(5)

concluded that a species would remain viable as long as the threshold

percentage o f each type o f habitat remaining in the chosen alternative was
greater than the percentage required for that species to survive.

Its analysis, however, included no discussion of conservation biology principles, despite
the voluminous peer-reviewed and published articles, acceptance into the scientific
community, and testability o f its theories. As suggested in Part II, an agency charged with
maintaining biodiversity on public lands ought to consider these principles when designing
forest reserves. Moreover, it did not even include an analysis o f actual population data.
Plaintiffs in Inland Empire argued that, at the very least, NFMA's diversity regulation
required that population data be gathered on Management Indicator Species (MISs) and be
used to measure the impact o f habitat changes on the forest's diversity.
To answer the question o f whether NFMA's diversity provision requires actual
population data for a diversity analysis, the court in Inland Empire looked to the plain
™ Id. at 761.
M at 760.
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language o f the NFMA's implementing regulation, which states:

Fish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable populations of
existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area. For
planning purposes, a viable population shall be regarded as one which has estimated
numbers and distribution or reproductive individuals to insure its continued existence
is well distributed in the planning area. In order to insure that viable populations will
be maintained, habitat must be provided to support, at least, a minimum number of
reproductive individuals and that habitat must be well distributed so that those
individuals can interact with others in the planning area. 36 C.F.R. 219.19 (emphasis
added).

The court, implicitly applying a two-step analytical approach similar to that o f Chevron,
stated that "[w]e start, as we must, with the plain language o f the Regulation.” ' I f the
regulatory "language . . . is unambiguous, and its literal application does not conflict with the
intentions o f its drafters, the plain meaning should p r e v a i l . I f it is ambiguous and unclear,
then the court reviews the agency's interpretation o f its own regulations solely to see whether
that interpretation is arbitrary and capricious.”
Under this standard, courts consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error o f j u d g m e n t . I n other words,
an agency's interpretation o f its own regulations controls unless “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.”’’*^“This is especially true when questions of scientific
methodology are involved.” '” Likewise, “an agency is entitled to rely on reasonable

M at 761.
Id. at 761 (citing Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner o f Internal Revenue, 997 F.2d 1285,
1289 (9th Cir. 1993)).
Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Service, 137 P.3rd 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1998).
Nevada Land Action Association v. U.S. Forest Service, 8 F.3rd 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1993).
Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Schultz, 992 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1993).
Cuddy, 137 P.3rd at 1376; see also Schultz, 992 F.2d at 981 (stating that a court is not qualified to
resolve a dispute where it would have to decide that the views o f a plaintiffs experts
have "more merit that those o f a defendant’s. It will not second-guess methodological choices made
by an agency in its area of expertise. Rather, it will defer to agency expertise on questions of
methodology unless the agency has completely failed to address some factor, “consideration of
which was essential to a duly informed decision . . . ”).
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assumptions in its environmental analyses.”’’*
Acknowledging the legal context in which to operate, the court stated that “ [t]he
Regulation specifically provides that the Forest Service m ay discharge its duties through
habitat management as long as habitat [is] provided to support, at least, a minimum
number o f reproductive individuals and that habitat [is] well distributed so that those
individuals can interact with others in the planning area.” ” ^ The court then stated that the
diversity regulation clearly requires a habitat analysis. But it found the regulation
ambiguous as to whether the Forest Service was required to gather actual population data
on MISs to be used to measure the impact o f habitat changes. Thus, it moved to the
second and deferential step, even though it could have resolved the issue before reaching
this step and required the Forest Service to gather actual population data.’*"
Nevertheless, the court reviewed the Forest Service's interpretation o f 219.19
solely to see whether the interpretation was “plainly erroneous” or “inconsistent” with its
regulatory duty. To begin its analysis, the court stated that the “service is entitled to rely
on reasonable assumptions in its environmental analyses.” '*’ It found the Service's

88 F.3rdat761.
See Sierra Club v. Martin. 168 F.3d 1. (11th Cir. 1999). The Eleventh Circuit Court o f Appeals was
faced with a question strikingly similar to that in Inland: Was the Forest Service required to conduct a
population analysis with actual population data, or was a habitat analysis sufficient to discharge its
duty? The court considered not only the diversity regulation 219.19, but found the requirements in
219.19(a)(6) and 219.26 applicable as well. When read together, the court could answer the question
and dispose of the issue before reaching the deferential stage.
For instance, the court interpreted section 219(a)(6), which states that “[p]opulation trends o f the
management indicator species will be monitored and relationships to habitat changes determined,” and
reasoned that it “is implicit that population data must be collected before it can be monitored and its
relationships determined.” It then interpreted section 219.26, which states:
Forest plaiming shall provide for the diversity o f plant and animal communities and
tree species consistent with the overall multiple use objectives o f the platming area. Such
diversity shall be considered throughout the planning process. Inventories shall include
quantitative data making possible the evaluation of diversity in terms o f its prior and present
condition. 219.26
The court found that “219.26 requires that inventories o f quantitative data be used when evaluating
the effect o f management alternatives on forest diversity,” and that before inventories can be evaluated,
they have to be collected. The court then reasoned that “if 219.19(a)(6) mandates that MIS serve as the
means through which to measure the Forest Plan's impact on diversity, then, taken together, the two
regulations require the Forest Service to gather quantitative data on MIS and use it to measure the
impact o f habitat changes on the forest’s diversity.” Interpreting the regulations in any other way would
rob them o f their meaning, and would be unacceptable.
Inland Empire, 88 .3rd at 761 (citing Sierra Club v. Marita, 845 F.Supp 1317,1331 (E.D. Wis.
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assum ption-m aintaining more acreage o f habitat than is necessary for survival would in
fact assure a species’ survival-em inently r e a s o n a b l e . I n fact, it stated that the
Service's methodology reasonably ensured viable populations by requiring that the
decision area contain a sufficient amount o f habitat and habitat types necessary for
s u r v i v a l . T h e court then held that the Forest Service’s interpretation was neither
“plainly erroneous” nor “inconsistent.”

It reached this conclusion, however, without

inquiring into the reasonableness o f the Forest Se vice’s assumption, though for the
reasons discussed in Part IV, section D, it should have.

B.

Inland Empire and the Daubert Factors
This section is concerned with answering one question not addressed in Inland

Empire: whether it is unreasonable to rely on assumptions that are based on scientific
evidence that would not withstand a two-step Daubert review. Because the plaintiffs in
the case argued that a habitat analysis was not sufficient to comply with the regulation
219.19— rather than specifically challenging the assumption underlying the Forest
Service’s methodology— this question was not specifically addressed and facts were not
gathered.'*^ The plaintiffs, however, could have explicitly challenged the Forest Service’s
assumption, arguing that it was unreasonable under a two-step Daubert review and,
hence, the Forest Service’s reliance upon it violated 219.19. Because courts have not
explicitly begun to apply such a review, it is understandable that the plaintiffs withheld
this argument.
But consider the following scenario. Plaintiffs could have challenged the Forest
Service’s assumption, arguing that the theories o f conservation biology undermine the
scientific basis for it. The plaintiffs and defendants could have then supported their

1994); Greenpeace Action v. Franklin 14 F.3rd 1324, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1992).
Inland Empire, 88 F.3rd at 761.
M at 761.
'" M at 761.
39

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

positions by pointing to scientific evidence developed in the administrative record. W ith
such evidence in front o f them, a court could have applied the Daubert factors to
determine whether each position had sufficient indicia o f reliability. If they did, then the
court should have deferred to the agency so long as it considered all and only reliable and
relevant evidence presented to it.
If, however, the scientific evidence used to support one o f the parties’ positions
was demonstrated to be unreliable, the court should ensure that it was not the one used by
the agency as the basis for its assumption. If it was, then the court should find the
assumption unreasonable and, hence, a plainly erroneous or inconsistent interpretation o f
its regulatory duty in violation o f the N FM A .‘®^ It should then require the agency to: (1)
reconsider all that scientific evidence which is both reliable and relevant; and (2) to
choose a methodology, from which its assumptions originate, that is supported by such
evidence. Notably, this review still allows agencies to rely on reasonable assumptions, so
long as they are based on consideration o f all that scientific evidence which is reliable
and relevant.'®’

VI.

Hard Look
In this final part, I argue that a court should use the two-step Daubert review to

determine whether an agency took a “hard look” at the “foreseeable environmental
consequences o f its proposed action” '®®I use the case Sierra Club v. M arita’^^ to

M at 761.
For discussions about assumptions see generally Marita I, 845 F.Supp 1317 (E.D. Wis. 1994);
Greenpeace, 14 F.B"® 1324 (9'*' Cir. 1992); Foundation for North American Wild Sheep v. U.S. Dept, of
Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172 (9* Cir. 1982).
See King, supra note 19 at 157.
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement for “every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(C). NEPA requires the
government to disclose and take a “hard look” at the foreseeable environmental consequences o f its
decision, and the reasonable alternatives to that decision. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.
21 (1976).
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demonstrate the importance o f this review, and I explore this argument in the context o f
the N FM A ’s forest planning requirements.
The NFMA takes a two-stage approach to forest planning. Under the first stage,
“a team . . . develops a proposed [Land Resource M anagement Plan] together with a draft
and final EIS.” '^° Once the LRMP is approved, direct implementation o f the plan occurs
at the second stage, where individual site-specific projects are proposed and assessed.'^'
Site-specific projects must be consistent with the stage-one, forest-wide plan.'®^
Both stages, however, must comply with the NFM A's substantive requirements, such as
the diversity one.'^^ Consequently, this forest planning framework enables
environmental plaintiffs to make the following argument:
In developing a LRMP, the agency ignored conservation biology principles.
By doing so, it failed to consider the plan's effect on biological diversity.
Without considering these principles, the agency could not have taken the
requisite “hard look” at the foreseeable environmental consequences o f its
proposed action or conducted a proper diversity analysis. Thus the agency
violated both NEPA's “hard look” requirement and the NFM A's diversity one.
As you can see, this argument weaves the N FM A diversity requirement into a “hard
look” one, and it is NEPA's “hard look” doctrine that is the focus o f this section.
By passing NEPA, Congress committed federal agencies to protecting and promoting
environmental quality. To ensure that comm itment is kept, NEPA requires federal
agencies to prepare an environmental impact statem ent (EIS) for "every recomm endation
or report on proposals for legislation and other m ajor Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality o f the human environment.” '^'' The EIS requirement “serves

Marita II, 46 F.3rd 606 (7'" Cir. 1995).
Inland Empire 88 F.3rd at 757.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 757.
Cuddy, 137F.3rd at 1376.
42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C).
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NEPA's 'action-forcing' purposes” ’’^ in two important ways; (1) by ensuring that the
agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed
information concerning significant environmental impacts; and (2) by guaranteeing that
the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience so that it may also
play a role in both the decision-making process and the implementation o f that
decision.” ^
The Court has characterized the requirement that the agency have “detailed
information” before it as requiring the agency to take a “hard look” '^’ at the foreseeable
environmental consequences o f its proposed actions.” '^ The only role for a court,
however, is to insure that the agency has in fact taken a “hard look.” ’^’ Notably,
“ [n]either the statute nor its legislative history contemplates that a court should substitute
its judgm ent for that o f the agency as to the environmental consequences o f its actions.
NEPA “merely prohibits uninformed— rather than unwise— agency action.”^”'
So, “when specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to
rely on the reasonable opinions o f its own qualified experts even i f . . . a court might find
contrary views more persuasive

In fact, “NEPA does not require [the court to] decide

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
Methow Valley 490 U.S. at 349.
Cuddy 137 F.3rd at 1376; see also iow e, 109 F.3rd 521; Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, 137
F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 1998) (when reviewing to see whether a LRMP satisfies NEPA's requirements,
courts in the Ninth Circuit will employ a “rule o f reason” to determine whether the EIS contains a
“reasonably thorough discussion o f the significant aspects o f probable environmental consequences.
Under this standard, it must ensure that that the agency took a “hard look” at the environmental
consequences of its proposed action).
Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 350 (stating that simply by focusing the agency’s attention on the
environmental consequences o f a proposed project, NEPA ensures that important effects will not be
overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die
otherwise cast).
Kleppe. 427 US. 390,410 n.21 (1976).
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416 (1971); see also Schultz,
992 F.2d at 981 (quoting Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (9th Cir.
1985))(a court will not be placed in a position where it will have to decide that the views o f one party's
experts have “more merit” than those o f the other party's experts).
Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 351.
202
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 351 (1989).
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w hether an [EIS] is based on the best scientific methodology available, nor does NEPA
require [a court] to resolve disagreements among various scientists as to m ethodology.”^®^
Omission o f any meaningful consideration o f fundamental factors, however, precludes
the type o f informed decision-making mandated by NEFA.^®'*
Acknowledging the agency's duty under the “hard look” doctrine, the Council on
Environmental quality drafted regulations to prevent uninformed agency decision
making. By doing so, it required that agencies rely on “high quality” science to
understand ecological systems:
The information [in the NEPA documents, including the FIS] m ust be o f
high quality. Accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public
scrutiny are essential to implementing NEPA.

Agencies shall insure the professional integrity, including scientific
integrity, o f the discussion and analyses in environmental impact statements.^®^
In light o f these regulations, a court—pursuant to a “hard look” review—ought to
evaluate the scientific evidence that was before the agency when it made its decision to
ensure the accuracy and integrity o f such evidence. 1 suggest that a court employ a twostep Daubert review when m aking this evaluation. Thus, an agency would be allowed to
consider only “high quality” science—science that has been screened for reliability and
relevance—in reaching its decisions.
Conducting the review in this context would not be burdensome, for NEPA already
requires the agency to supply the data necessary for such a review. For instance, NEPA
requires that the public receive.the underlying environmental data from which Forest

™ Schultz, 992 F.2d at 981 (quoting Friends o f Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976,
986 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Wild Sheep, 681 F.2d at 1178.
-°MOCFR. 1500.1(b) (1994).
Methodology and Scientific Accuracy, 40 C.F.R. 1502.24 (1994); see also Thomas, 137 F.3rd
at 1151 (stating that the importance o f these regulations lies in the fact that accurate scientific
analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing NEPA); 40
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Service experts derive their opinions/''^ h also requires agencies to identify any
methodologies used and to make explicit reference by footnote to the scientific and other
sources relied upon for conclusions used in any EIS statement^'* To demonstrate the
necessity for a Daubert analysis in the context o f a “hard look” review, I will analyze the
case Sierra Club v. Marita.

C ase In Point: Sierra Club v. Marita

A.

In Marita the plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service violated the NFM A and
NEPA in developing management plans for two W isconsin national forests.^®^
Specifically, they argued that NEPA's “hard look” requirem ent mandated consideration
o f conservation biology principles and that N FM A's diversity requirement mandated
application o f th e m /'" Because the Forest Service disposed o f these principles without
doing either, the plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service violated both a c ts /" Ultimately,
the court found for the defendants/'^
Though Marita was decided by the Seventh Circuit Court o f Appeals, the Ninth
Circuit in Inland Empire cited it as persuasive authority for a very important proposition:
Courts ought to defer to agencies on questions o f scientific methodology. But should
they?
Consider the following fact from Marita and the argument the Forest Service made.
First, the Regional Forester approved LRM P's that specifically prescribed that managed
and unmanaged old growth should “occur as scattered small areas across the
F o re st..

Note that this prescription flies in the face o f the-bigger-the-better

C.F.R. 1500.1(b).
Thomas, 137 F.3rd at 1150.
Wat 1150; 40 C.F.R 1502.24.
Marita II, 46 F.3rd at 614.
at 614.
In other words, plaintiffs argued that diversity is not comprehensible solely through analysis
of the numbers of plants and animals and the variety of species in a given area. Rather, diversity
also requires an understanding o f the relationships between differing landscape patterns and
among various habitats.
Marita II, 46 F.3rd at 624.
See Marita 1, 843 F.Supp. at 1536.
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principle. Second, the Forest Service made this argument in support o f its decision;

The-bigger-the-better principle was derived from studies in island
biogeography. Because those studies were conducted on true islands and in the
Pacific Northwest, it is not clear whether their predictions are relevant to
W isconsin forests, as our forests have a very different forest composition and
structure. Moreover, island biogeography has never been tested in Wisconsin, so
it is uncertain whether its predictions would hold true for W isconsin's forests.
Thus, we are not going to test conservation biology's theories at the expense o f
other forest plan objectives.
The court agreed with the Forest Service, and reiterated the fact that the Forest Service
had looked at the theory o f island biogeography as well as conservation biology's
principle and found them both to be uncertain in application.^'^ The court also noted that
the Forest Service had considered setting aside the large Diversity M anagement Areas
(DMA's) the conservation biologists suggested were required to preserve biodiversity. It
then agreed with the district court that the Forest Service was not required to set aside
the DMA's or to address issues o f forest fragmentation^'* because the theory o f island
biogeography had not been shown applicable to W isconsin's forests. Finally, it held that
failing to directly address or consider the predictions o f island biogeography—or the
scientific evidence supporting the conservation biologists' principles—in its final analysis
was not a violation of the “hard look” doctrine.^*’
In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished between uncertainty in application
and uncertainty in theory. Citing Daubert, it acknowledged that arguably there are no
certainties in science.^'* But it then stated that “however valid a general theory may be.

See generally Marita II, 46 F,3rd 606.
Id. at 620.
*'* Marita I, 843 F.Supp. at 1539.
A/an'ra II, 46 F.3rd at 621; see also Marita I, 843 F.Supp at 1540 (stating that the service did not
directly consider principles of conservation biology.)
Marita II, 46 F.3rd at 622.
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it does not translate into a management tool unless one can apply it to a concrete
s i t u a t i o n . T h e fact that the Forest Service had not fully considered conservation
biology and its interpretation o f island biogeography theory was not a violation o f
NEPA, the court reasoned, because it was not required to engage in a significant
discussion o f environmental consequences o f a science it had determined to be uncertain
in application.^^®
But the court should not have perm itted the Forest Service to discard conservation
biology principles, and hence its “hard look” obligation, on the basis that they were
uncertain in application. First, the court failed to recognize the importance o f
conservation biology's theories and, instead, viewed them as “m ere” theories. As we
learned in Part III, however, theories are the facts o f science,^^' as they are "the best
available explanation[s] left after alternatives have been rigorously tested and
eliminated.”^^^ Moreover, courts should not demand that every scientific statement have,
in fact, been tested before it is considered— only demand that every statement m ust be
capable o f being tested.
Second, the court's uncertainty distinction is not persuasive. As the Daubert Court
stated, “it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject o f scientific testimony must
be “known” to a certainty; arguably there are no certainties in seience”^^^ Rather,
“scientists accept uncertainty as a fact o f life.”^^'* Although m any people “are
uncomfortable unless they have positive, eternal answers, scientists come to term s with

Id. at 622; but see NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2 (Island Press, 1994). The authors
devote an entire chapter to the application o f conservation biology principles. It is entitled “Designing
Reserve Networks.”
Marita II, 46 F.3rd at 621-22 and n.11. The Seventh Circuit cited a Ninth Circuit case. Marble
Mountain, for this proposition. In that case, the Service had entirely ignored the question of
maintaining a biological corridor between two wilderness areas in drafting an EIS. The court found that
at least in Marita , the agency had looked at the principles-though it had not "discussed" them.
See King, supra note 19 at 151.
Daubert, 509 U.S, at 590.
See FUTUYAMA; supra note 12, at 163.
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uncertainty and mutability as a fundamental condition o f hum an knowiedge.

"2 2 5

Therefore, if uncertainty exists in most of, if not all, sciences, then there would always be
a measure o f uncertainty in application.
Third, Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., does
not support the court's ruling, though the court cited that case to support its deference to the
Forest Service's decision to discard conservation biology on the basis of its uncertainty. In
Baltimore Gas, the Supreme Court stated that “a reviewing court must remember that [when]
the [agency] is making predictions, within its area o f special expertise, at the frontiers o f
science . . . as opposed to simple findings o f fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its
most deferential.”^^® By using “generally” in its statement, however, the Court was not
requiring deference in these situations. In fact, the Court reminded reviewing courts that,
even in such a case, their “task is to determine whether the [agency] has considered the
relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.”^^’ Indeed, expertise models do not mandate judicial deference.
Notably, the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council declared that
the difference between the arbitrary and capricious standard—the standard referred to in
Baltimore Gas—and the reasonableness one “is not of great pragmatic consequence” and is
difficult to discem.^^’ The reasonableness inquiry, therefore, should be seen as similar to the
inquiry into whether an agency's decision is arbitrary and capricious.^” In fact, the Ninth
Circuit has interpreted the Court's language in Baltimore Gas as requiring judicial deference
to an agency's interpretation o f equivocal evidence only in the case where such an

Id. at 164 (1983).
Central Arizona, 990 F.2d at 1540 (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, Inc., 462 U.S. 87,
103 (1983)).
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983).
Central Arizona, 990 F.2d at 1540 n.l 1 (citing Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (the
Supreme Court indicated in that case that the expertise model does not mandate judicial
deference.)
Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377 n.23.
See Sunstein supra note 97 at 2105.
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interpretation is reasonable.^^'
However, the Forest Service's decision to exclude conservation biology from its final
analysis was not reasonable, as those p rinciples-and the scientific evidence supporting
th e m -w e re reliable, relevant, and suggested that the Forest Service's methodology was
not an effective one for maintaining biodiversity. Courts, therefore, ought to conduct a
two-step Daubert review in these “hard look” cases for three reasons: (1) to ensure the
agency's interpretation o f equivocal evidence was reasonable; (2) to ensure the agency
used “high quality” science—that which is reliable and relevant—in taking a “hard look”;
and (3) to ensure that its decision was truly informed. Thus, contrary to the court's
conclusion in Marita, an agency's failure to meaningfully consider and discuss scientific
evidence that is both reliable and relevant, such as that offered by the conservation
biologists, does not comport with the rule articulated in Baltimore Gas nor with NEPA's
“hard look” requirement.
In Marita, the plaintiffs actually suggested that the court apply the Daubert factors to
determine whether the Forest Service's assertions were owed deference and whether
conservation biology should have been considered in spite o f its u n c e r t a i n t y . B u t the
court denied the plaintiffs’ request and stated that “while such a proposal might assure
better documentation o f an agency's scientific decisions, we think that forcing an agency
to make such a showing as a general rule is intrusive, undeferential, and not required.
Yet, the Marita court did not establish that a Daubert analysis o f an agency
determination is never appropriate. Rather, as one com mentator noted, “ [i]t is possible
that as the court becomes more comfortable reviewing the m ethodologies by which
private parties prove causation, courts m ay begin probing in greater depth those used by

Central Arizona, 990 F.2d at 1540.
Marita II, 46 F.3rd at 621-22.
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agencies.”^^'*
Finally, consider the rule in Marsh: when specialists express conflicting views, an
agency m ust have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions o f its own qualified
experts even if, as an original matter, a court m ight find contrary views more
persuasive?^^ The rule seems to support the M arita court's decision, for the Forest
Service's experts had determined that island biogeography was uncertain in application
and recommended another course o f action. But a Daubert review would force an
agency to consider “only that evidence which is o f equal scientific reliability before [the]
deferential stage is reached.”^^^ Therefore, an agency's reliance on its expert's opinions
would occur only if those opinions are scientifically reliable,

and, as I will

demonstrate in Section B o f this Part, those o f the defendant's were questionable.

B.

Marita and the Daubert Factors
Because the plaintiffs in Marita argued that the Forest Service was required to

consider and apply conservation biology principles, the Sierra Club and the Forest
Service both supported their positions by directing the trial court's attention to the
scientific evidence developed in the administrative record. This case, therefore,
demonstrates how a court can apply the Daubert factors not only to the defendant's
science, but to the plaintiffs as well. In this paper, I will apply the two-step Daubert
review to the disagreement over island biogeography
The following chart summarizes the scientific evidence the court in Marita reviewed
to resolve this issue.

See Nicolas Targ & Elise Feldman, Courting Science: Expert Testimony after Daubert and
Carmichael, 13 Nat. Resources & Env't 507, 512-13 (1999),
Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378.
See King, supra note 19, at 157.

at 151 (1995).
-^ /(/at 147 (1995).
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T w n-S T E P REVIEW

In Maritfl, the plaintiffs contended that the theory o f island biogeography required
large forest reserves to be set-aside in order to preserve overall biodiversity. The defendants
simply contended that it did not.

F IR S T STEP.

Determine whether the predictions o f island biogeography are reliable? If they are,
they must be considered by the agency. I f they are not, they should not be considered.
C O N T EN T IO N S
Forest Service
Several small reserves will
maintain overall biological
diversity.

Conservation biologists
Island biogeography suggest that
large undisturbed areas o f forest be
set aside in order to ensure viable
populations o f forest communities
and, hence to maintain overall
biological diversity.

DA UBERT FA C T O R S

(A) TESTABILITY/FALSIFIABILITY:
Forest Service

Conservation Biologists

Several small reserves will
not maintain overall biological
diversity.

Island biogeography does not
require that large areas o f
undisturbed forest be set aside
in order to m aintain overall
biological diversity.

(B) PEER REVIEW AND PU BLICATION:

239

Forest service

Conservation Biologists

A reference to Larry Harris,
“The Fragmented Forest.” '®*

Several studies, m ost o f them
describing the effects o f habitat

Id. at 168-69 (1995)(asserting that “The Fragmented Forest” is a unrefereed (not a peer-reviewed
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Harris suggest that biodiversity
can be preserved by maintaining
several small reserves.

size on gray w olf populations
in Wisconsin.

Note: These w olf studies show
the negative impact that
fragmentation has on a single
species. Although Island
biogeography typically refers to
the total num ber o f species and
the area affect on them, the w olf
studies are evidence that island
biogeography’s predictions
apply to W isconsin’s forests.
(C) GENERAL ACCEPTANCE:
Forest Service

Conservation Biologists

No indication o f general
acceptance was presented
to the court.

Thirteen experts unanimously
agreed that diversity cannot be
maintained without the
m aintenance o f large forest
reserves. The experts supported
their contention with a mountain
o f peer review and published
literature.'®^

(D) RATE OF ERROR: Not applicable in this case.

SECOND STEP
Did the agency consider all and only that scientific evidence which was reliable and
relevant before making its decision?

(A)

RELEVANCE;

Both contentions are relevant, as they directly address ways to preserve
biodiversity.
publication). Though one must acknowledge that even if King’s assertion is correct, the publication is
well accepted and often cited. Reed Noss even cites the work, but not for the proposition that small
reserves are better than large ones. See Noss, Supra note 7, at 90 n.32 (1994).
Plaintiffs Statement o f Reasons (SOR) 95-97, 180-85.
103

See Soule and Simberloff, supra note 2, at 32.
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(B)

CONSIDERED ALL AND ONLY RELIABLE AND RELEVANT EVIDENCE:

No, if the court found that the Forest Service's contention was not
supported by reliable scientific evidence. Yet, even if it was supported by
such evidence, the Forest Service would not have satisfied this second
step if the court determined that the Conservation Biologists' contention
was also reliable and relevant and was not considered in the Forest
Service's final analysis.

In Marita, both the Forest Service and the conservation biologists were able to present
testable predictions. The Forest Service contended that several small reserves will
maintain overall biological d i v e r s i t y T h i s contention can be falsified by the
observation that overall biological diversity declines when several small reserves are
created after timber harvesting leaves a forest fragmented. The conservation biologists,
on the other hand, contended that diversity cannot be maintained unless a meaningful
portion o f the forests are reserved for large tracts o f relatively undisturbed forest, relying
on the theory o f island biogegraphy for support.^"^ This contention can be falsified by the
observation that large blocks o f relatively undisturbed habitat are not necessary to
m aintain biodiversity. Both parties, therefore, present testable predictions.
The second criterion, peer review and publication, indicated a difference in the
scientific evidence used to support each party’s contention. The conservation biologists
used a number o f peer-reviewed articles documenting the effects o f habitat size on gray
w olf populations in W isconsin to support their contention. Although these studies
document the negative impact fragmentation has on a single species, they support island
biogeography's prediction that the size o f a habitat patch and its distance from other
patches—consisting o f similar habitat—affects the total number o f species that can exist in
those areas (see relevancy discussion below). The scientific evidence used to support
plain tiff s contention, therefore, was peer reviewed and published and could satisfy this
criterion.
- ■Marita /, 843 F.Supp. at 1539.
Marita /, 843 F.Supp, at 1538.
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The Forest Service, however, relied upon a single p u b l i c a t i o n , w h i c h one
commentator asserted was not peer reviewed, to support its contention.^'^^ One must
acknowledge, however, that Larry H arris’ “The Fragmented Forest” is often cited by
reputable scientists, though not for its proposition that biodiversity can be maintained
through use o f small reserves.^''^ Yet, the Forest Service's contention was supported by
other articles that had been peer reviewed. Notably, the Single Large or Several Small
(SLOSS) debate produced peer-reviewed articles indicating that biodiversity could be
maintained with small reserves,^"*^ but the Forest Service chose instead to rely on Larry
Harris' publication and failed to bring the others to the court's attention.^'** A court ought
to consider facts such as these when deciding whether a contention is reliable, and use the
other Daubert factors to help guide it in its reliability determination.
The third criterion, general acceptance, indicates a distinct difference between the two
contentions. The conservation biologists presented the testimony o f thirteen experts, all
o f whom unanimously agreed that diversity cannot be maintained without large forest
reserves and pointed to several letters o f support from respected scientists in the field.
The testimony and letters indicate general acceptance. Conversely, the Forest Service
presented no evidence to the court indicating general acceptance for its contention, for
even at the time it issued its LRMP's, there was general agreement in the scientific
community that large preserves were preferable to small ones.^'*^
In sum, the conservation biologists supported their contention with evidence that
meets all the applicable criteria o f Daubert. The Forest Service, on the other hand,
generated a testable prediction, relied heavily on one, arguably unrefereed, publication

LARRY D. HARRIS, THE FRAGMENTED FOREST 113-15 (1984) (suggesting that biodiversity
can be preserved by maintaining several small reserves.)
See King, supra note 19 at 168-69 (1995) (asserting that "The Fragmented Forest" is a unrefereed
(not a peer-reviewed publication)).
See Noss, supra note 7, at 90 n.32.
See Simberloff and Abele, supra note 1, at 285-286; see also Daniel Simberloff, Review o f theory’
relevant to acquiring land. Report to Florida Department of Natural Resources. Florida State
University, Tallahassee , FL (1991); Robert May, Island Biogeography and the Design o f Wildlife
Preserves.” 254 NATURE Vol.254 (1975). See generally QUAMMEN, supra note 1, at 457-545.
Marita /, 843 F.Supp at 1540.
See Soule and Simberloff, supra note 2 at 32 (1986).
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for support, and offered no evidence o f general acceptance for its contention. A court
could, therefore, reasonably conclude that the defendant’s contention was not supported
by reliable science. In such a case, the court should then require the Forest Service to: (1)
reconsider all that scientific evidence which is both reliable and relevant; and (2) to
choose a m ethodology that is supported by such evidence. Nevertheless, the court in
M arita deferred to the Forest Service.
If the Marita court had applied a two-step Daubert review, it would have
proceeded to the second step o f a Daubert review only if it found that the Forest
Service's contention was supported by reliable evidence. Assuming for illustrative
purposes that the Forest Service's contention was reliable, a court would then ensure that
the Forest Service considered all and only reliable and relevant evidence. Here the court
would consider the relevance o f the conservation biologists’ use o f evidence
documenting the affects o f habitat size on gray w olf populations. Because such evidence
corroborated the conservation biologists' contention that large patches are necessary to
maintain biodiversity, it would be relevant. Moreover, the conservation
biologists’contention was supported by evidence that satisfied all the Daubert reliability
criteria. Thus, even if the Forest Service had supported its contention with reliable
evidence, it would have failed under this second step, which ensures sciences such as
conservation biology receive a “fair hearing” in an agency’s decision-making process.^^**

VII. Conclusion
Until courts conduct a two-step Daubert review, reliable scientific principles, such as
those o f conservation biology, are not guaranteed a “fair hearing” in the agency decision
making process. Such a review, however, would not require agencies to employ any
particular scientific methodology. That policy choice would be left to the agency, so long
as it considered all and only reliable and relevant evidence in reaching its decision.

Marita /, 843 F.Supp at 1540 (stating that the service did not directly consider principles of
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In Chevron cases, a court can conduct a Daubert review to determine w hether an
agency's interpretation o f an ambiguous statutory provision is truly reasonable, for it is
difficult to find that a Congressional delegation o f authority to an agency entitles that
agency to use unreliable or irrelevant scientific evidence when deciding the correct
course o f action. Pilchuck demonstrates how the court has already implicitly begun to use
a Daubert review to inquire into the reasonableness o f such a decision. Notably, a twostep Daubert review is entirely consistent w ith Chevron as a court would not technically
be interpreting statutory provisions by conducting such review, rather they would simply
be requiring agencies to use reliable and relevant evidence. Even if it did involve
statutory interpretation, conducting such a review is consistent with Chevron's
reasonableness requirement. Moreover, if one were to suggest that a two-step Daubert
review is not consistent w ith Chevron, such a review is supported by other interpretive
norms that displace Chevron.
In NFMA diversity cases, a court ought to conduct a Daubert review when
plaintiffs specifically challenge the assumptions underlying a scientific methodology. As
noted in the Inland Empire discussion, the defendant's assumption—maintaining more
acreage of habitat than is necessary for survival would in fact assure a species’ survivalfailed to take into account certain conservation biology principles. Yet, the court deferred to
the Forest Service and held that the “service is entitled to rely on reasonable assumptions in
its environmental analyses,” though the court did not inquire into the reasonableness o f the
assumption. If the court had, it would have discovered that the Forest Service's methodology
necessarily assumed a result that was not based on consideration of all reliable and relevant
scientific evidence. In fact, the court would have discovered that conservation biology
undermined the scientific basis for the Forest Service's assumption. In such a case, a court
ought to require the Forest Service to; (1 ) reconsider all that scientific evidence which is both

conservation biology).
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reliable and relevant; and (2) to choose a methodology that is supported by such evidence.
Finally, in NEPA “hard look” cases, a court ought to also conduct a Daubert review. The
CEQ, passed regulations to foster informed decision making, requiring that scientific
evidence used in NEPA documents be o f “high quality.” CEQ, was hopeful these
requirements would help agencies take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of
their proposed actions. Yet, as demonstrated in the Marita discussion, the Forest Service
does not always take the requisite “hard look” or employ scientific methodologies that are
scientifically reliable. In these cases, I suggest that courts conduct a two-step Daubert review
for three reasons: (1) to ensure the agency's interpretation of equivocal evidence was
reasonable; (2) to ensure the agency used “high quality” science—that which is reliable and
relevant—in taking a “hard look”; and (3) to ensure that its decision was truly informed.
In sum, we must raise the standards by which agencies make decisions that determine the
fate o f biological communities. Reliable and relevant scientific evidence must become the
foundation for environmental management decisions. Species are depending on us. The
law must evolve to recognize this responsibility.
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